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While migration studies scholars have paid considerable attention to 
internal migration within Indonesia, as well as to international labour 
migration flows from Indonesia, they have rarely considered the 
intersections between these two processes. This paper addresses the 
gap through a close analysis of migration flows in one of Indonesia’s 
key transit areas – the Riau Islands. We argue that in the borderlands 
the processes of internal and international migration are mutually 
constitutive. The Riau Islands’ status as a transit zone for 
international labour migrants and as a destination for internal 
migrants determines its demographic profile and policies of migration 
control. Bordering practices are strongly influenced by the fact that 
not everyone who comes to the Riau Islands has the intention of 
moving on, and not all international migrants returning to the islands 
intend to go home. Our analysis demonstrates that internal migration 
cannot be understood as a solely national phenomenon, and that 
international migration cannot only be explained by push and pull 
factors in sending and receiving destinations. These complexities 
necessitate research and policy responses that take into account the 
unique character of the transit provinces, and the role that their 
geographical location plays in the formation of multi-ethnic 
communities and the management of migration. 
ndonesia is the focus of considerable attention within contemporary migration 
studies. Migration scholars have documented in detail the dual processes of 
internal migration (both state-sponsored transmigration as well as “spontaneous” 
internal migration) within Indonesia as well as international labour migration flows 
from Indonesia. Internal migration, especially through the transmigration 
programme, has changed the economic, environmental and ethnic landscapes of 
many regions in Indonesia’s outer islands (Dawson 1999; Elmhirst 2000; Fearnside 
1997; Tirtosudarmo 1990). Meanwhile, the placement of hundreds of thousands of 
Indonesians overseas every year has reshaped communities not only in migrant 
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workers’ provinces of origin, but in the borderland communities through which 
many of them pass on their way to and from overseas. In 2006, almost 650,000 
Indonesians were placed through formal international labour migration 
programmes (Depnakertrans 2007a, 2007b). Many hundreds of thousands more 
leave through unofficial channels. It has been suggested that in the 1990s, 
migration from Indonesia to Malaysia through official channels was only one-third 
of that through alternative channels (Nayyar 1997).  
It is perhaps surprising, then, that the literatures on these two kinds of migration 
seldom intersect. Instead, internal migration and international migration are dealt 
with as separate phenomena and the links between them are rarely considered. The 
extensive body of work on international labour migration from Indonesia has 
focused on national-level policies or on labour migrants’ experiences in their 
provinces of origin, during the process of migration, or in the destination country 
(cf. Hugo 2002; Sukamdi and Brownlee 2000).1 The ongoing preoccupation among 
researchers and activists with the regulatory frameworks and socio-cultural 
conditions in receiving countries and how these shape migrant workers’ 
experiences of labour migration (cf. Huang et al. 2005; Loveband 2004) was 
sparked by several high profile cases of physical and sexual abuse, and deaths of 
migrant workers, many of them women working as domestic helpers in Asia and 
the Middle East (HRW 2004; Quinn 2002). Other accounts deal in depth with the 
individual experiences of migrant workers themselves (cf. Abdul Rahman 2003; 
von der Borch 2006; Wong and Anwar 2003). With a few exceptions 
(Tirtosudarmo 2004; Ford 2001, 2006), the literature has said very little about the 
impact of migration flows on the transit provinces through which many of them 
pass.  
The lack of scholarly interest in Indonesia’s transit provinces in part reflects the 
highly centralised approach taken by the national government during the Suharto 
years (1966–98), when policy-makers paid little attention to the documented flows 
of migrant workers through Sumatra and Kalimantan and refused to recognise the 
large flows of undocumented labour migrants across land and sea borders. The 
centralised approach to labour migration policy continued until 2002, when 
Malaysia stepped up forced repatriation of undocumented labour migrants causing 
a humanitarian crisis in the East Kalimantan border zone centred around Nunukan 
(Ford 2006). Although since then more attention has been paid to structures and 
processes for managing returned labour migrants in the transit zones, there has 
been little examination of the broader socio-economic impacts of migration on the 
transit zone community themselves. 
This paper seeks to address this lacuna through a close analysis of migration flows 
in one of Indonesia’s key transit areas – the Riau Islands (Provinsi Kepulauan 
Riau, Kepri Province).2 The territory of Kepri Province consists of the main islands 
                                                     
1 For an overview of this literature see Ford (2006). 
2 The research on which this paper is based was funded by an Australian Research Council (ARC) 
Discovery Project grant In the Shadow of Singapore: The Limits of Transnationalism in Insular 
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of Bintan, Batam, Karimun (collectively known as the Riau Islands), along with 
Natuna and Lingga, as well as many other smaller islands and islets. The province 
was officially formed in 2002. Before that time, the islands – which lie in the 
Straits of Malacca to the north-east of Sumatra and directly south of Singapore – 
were incorporated into the Province of Riau, whose capital is located in Pekanbaru 
on the Sumatran Mainland. Like other borderland regions situated close to much 
wealthier economies, the Riau Islands have experienced rapid social and economic 
transformation by virtue of their proximity to Malaysia and Singapore. They are 
the site of considerable documented and undocumented labour flows to both 
countries, as well as the nearest point for repatriation of workers whose contracts 
have ended or undocumented migrants who have been deported. The islands have 
also attracted large numbers of internal transmigrants in search of work. This has 
particularly been the case since the formation of the Indonesia-Malaysia-Singapore 
Growth Triangle (IMS-GT) in 1990, a project that heralded a new era of cross-
border economic engagement, promising to restore Riau Islanders’ dreams of 
prosperity by leveraging Singapore’s status as an “Asian Tiger” to improve 
economic conditions in the islands, and by allowing the islanders special access to 
Singapore and Malaysia. 
We examine a range of geographical sites in Kepri Province in order to tease out 
the relationship between different forms of migration and various attempts to 
manage them. As Batam has been the main focus of the growth triangle initiative, it 
figures prominently in economic studies of the Riau Islands.3 As a result, the 
realities of different island communities are often lost: the experiences of other 
islanders are either ignored or aggregated with those of Batam Islanders. In order to 
understand the differential impact that internal and international migration has had 
on different parts of the province it is important to consider more than one 
geographical location. In this paper, we focus on two internal sites (Batam and 
Bintan islands) and two geopolitical border sites (the Indonesia-Singapore and the 
Indonesia-Malaysia borders) and trace the migration flows across and within these 
sites over a thirty-year period. We have chosen the island of Bintan for two 
reasons. First, it is the site of the current provincial capital, Tanjung Pinang (also 
an important pre-colonial and colonial seat of power); and second, it has been the 
focus of a number of significant development projects under the IMS-GT. Our 
research is the first attempt to bring together existing (and sometimes piecemeal) 
demographic and qualitative data with an analysis of the regulatory frameworks 
designed to control population movements within and through the province. Our 
analysis begins with an overview of population movements into and out of the 
islands. This section documents the socio-economic forces that have contributed to 
the movement of large numbers of Indonesians into the transit area. We examine 
                                                                                                                            
Riau (DP0557368) – see project website http://www.uow.edu.au/arts/research/intheshadow/. The 
ethnographic material draws on research interviews conducted with Riau Islanders and 
Singaporeans during 2004–07.  
3 In contrast, anthropological studies, with the exception of Lindquist (2004), focus on the island of 
Bintan (Wee 1985, 2002; Faucher 2006, 2002), or study the sea nomads of the region (Chou 2006; 
Chou and Wee 2002). 
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the impact that these movements have had on population sizes as well as the 
changing gender and ethnic composition of different island communities. This 
discussion serves as a background to the second part of the paper, where we 
explore the range of regulatory regimes that have been developed to shape and 
control population movements into and out of the Riau Islands. 
Drawing on these quantitative and qualitative data, we argue that the processes of 
internal and international migration are mutually constitutive in the borderlands. 
Therefore, in order to understand border crossings and international migration from 
the Riau Islands into Singapore and Malaysia, attention must be given to mobility 
and exclusion within the border zone itself. The Riau Islands’ status as a transit 
zone for international labour migrants and as a destination for internal migrants 
determines its demographic profile and policies of migration control. At the same 
time, the creation and control of internal borders within the borderlands is strongly 
influenced by the fact that not everyone who comes to the Riau Islands has the 
intention of moving on, and not all international migrants returning to the islands 
intend to go home. As the following discussion shows, policies designed to curb 
population movements between the islands and efforts to restrict migratory flows 
into and out of the province sometimes operate in accord, but more often they are 
incompatible. Closer attention to these interrelated processes allows us to develop a 
richer and more nuanced picture of migration patterns within the borderlands. Our 
analysis demonstrates that internal migration cannot be understood as a solely 
“national” phenomenon, and that international migration cannot only be explained 
by “push and pull” factors in sending and receiving destinations. 
1. The Riau Islands as a Site of Desire 
The Riau Islands are located along Indonesia’s frontier, thousands of kilometres 
from the nation’s capital in Jakarta. They lie along the edge of the border between 
Indonesia, Singapore and Peninsular Malaysia. By ferry, Batam is less than an hour 
from Singapore; Karimun, which lies to the west of Batam, is less than an hour 
from the State of Johor in Malaysia. The particular location and nature of the 
Indonesia-Singapore-Malaysia borderlands make this region a special kind of 
border zone. The islands have been a site of desire for both internal and 
international labour migrants since the colonial period because of their strategic 
location on the Straits of Malacca. The flows of people into the Riau Islands and 
across the geopolitical borders have not been uniform over this time, but have risen 
and fallen with the fortunes of the different islands and cross-border economic 
synergies and political tensions. In the contemporary period, the fact that the 
islands are separated by narrow straits from the cosmopolitan centre of Singapore 
and the booming economy of Peninsular Malaysia make this border zone quite 
different from Indonesia’s land borders with Eastern Malaysia, East Timor or 
Papua New Guinea. For example, in contrast to the transit zone of Nunukan in 
Eastern Kalimantan – which is imagined entirely as a place of crossing – the Riau 
Islands are both a space of intense movement internationally and a destination in 
themselves. 
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As the discussion that follows shows, the shifting patterns of human movement 
historically, but particularly over the last few decades, have had important 
consequences for the patterns of settlement, lifestyle and outlook in different 
communities in the islands. The rapid population growth experienced by both 
Batam and Bintan islands over this period has been the consequence of planned 
internal labour migration programmes, spontaneous labour migration generated by 
rumours of the region’s booming economy, and largely unplanned return migration 
by documented and undocumented international labour migrants. The islands also 
accommodate a large temporary migrant population of documented and 
undocumented labour migrants, and a smaller transitory population of Indonesian 
tourists.4 Our analysis demonstrates that these different “migrant” populations are 
not discrete, and individuals can move from one category to another over a short 
period of time. 
1.1. The Riau Islands as a destination 
Although Batam and Bintan are part of the same border zone, their history of 
development and the population and migration profiles are very different. Bintan 
has long been established as a major population centre. Its capital Tanjung Pinang 
is one of the oldest cities in the region and traces its historical origins back to the 
seat of the Johor-Riau Sultanate located a short distance away on the tiny island of 
Penyengat. Tanjung Pinang then played a key role as the seat of the Dutch 
government in the region and was a key trading and customs port during the 
colonial period. By 1971, the population of the Riau Islands as a whole had reached 
331,136 – a figure that had grown 1.7 per cent annually since 1961. Twelve per 
cent of the region’s population were non-citizen residents, many of them Chinese 
(Esmara 1975: 26, 28). However, during the 1970s thousands of people migrated to 
Tanjung Pinang from the main Indonesian islands of Java and Sumatra, and to a 
lesser extent from other parts of the archipelago. Some of these were serving 
members of the military forces who decided to settle in the islands with their 
families, rather than moving to a new posting. Others were attracted by the 
prospect of better paying jobs. Many of these labour migrants travelled to the 
islands through kinship networks, and although the majority intended to spend a 
short period of time in the islands amassing their savings (as part of a tradition of 
merantau), others decided to settle permanently (Sobary and Foulcher 1987). By 
1976, the total population of Bintan island was 111,091 (South China Sea Fisheries 
Development and Coordinating Program 1977). 
In contrast to Bintan, early migration to Batam was motivated by concerns to 
protect Indonesia’s territorial sovereignty. A number of young people moved to 
Batam to support the Indonesian army after the declaration of Independence in 
1945, and again during the period of Confrontation (Roeroe et al. 2003). The 
                                                     
4 The islands also attract a large number of international tourists, particularly from Singapore and 
Malaysia. While some of these tourists stay in the numerous beach resorts scattered on both islands, 
large numbers of working-class men also visit the islands as sex tourists. For a discussion of sex 
tourism in the islands see Ford and Lyons (2008). 
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population remained small in the early 1970s, when it reached an estimated 6,000 
(Otorita Batam n.d.: 6), but began to approach the size of Tanjung Pinang in the 
late 1970s. By 1978, the year that Batam was designated as a tax-free bonded zone 
for export industries, its population had increased to 31,800. The signing of a 
development agreement between Indonesia and Singapore in 1980 then attracted 
domestic and foreign investors, and during the next ten years, large numbers of 
construction workers were brought to Batam to develop Batamindo Industrial Park 
and its associated infrastructure (roads, ports, housing).  
Figure 1: Total Population of Batam and Bintan Islands (1990–2003) 
0
50,000
100,000
150,000
200,000
250,000
300,000
350,000
400,000
450,000
500,000
550,000
600,000
1990 1993 1998 2003
Year
Po
pu
la
tio
n
Batam
Bintan
 
Sources: Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Daerah Kabupaten Kepulauan Riau dengan PT. Duta 
Consultant Engineering (2005); Bappeda dan Badan Pusat Statistik Kabupaten Kepulauan 
Riau (1999); Bappeda dan Kantor Statistik Kabupaten Kepulauan Riau (1994, 1991); BPS 
Kota Batam (2004). 
Batam boasted a population of approximately 43,000 in 1983 (Roeroe et al. 2003), 
while Tanjung Pinang had a population of 47,175 in the same year (Sobary and 
Foulcher 1987: 9). Within a short period of time, however, the population on 
Batam had more than doubled. In 1990 Bintan’s total population stood at 157,451 
and Batam’s population was 105,820 – see Figure 1.5  
A major factor in this rapid population growth was the impending formation of the 
Indonesia-Malaysia-Singapore Growth Triangle. The proposal for the IMS-GT was 
spearheaded by the Singaporean Government, which was increasingly concerned 
                                                     
5 The statistics we have used for Bintan have been compiled by disaggregating the statistics for the 
former Regency of Insular Riau and recompiling them according to the new local government 
boundaries. This was necessary in order to generate meaningful data series. 
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about the rising cost of local labour and the movement of multi-nationals out of 
Singapore into more cost-efficient manufacturing sites in other parts of Asia (Lee 
1991). The proximity of the Riau Islands would allow Singapore to develop a 
“regionalisation strategy” that combined Singaporean capital and the city-state’s 
port and services industries with a ready pool of cheap labour (Sparke et al. 2004). 
The industrial manufacturing zones, ports and tourism projects established on the 
islands of Batam, Bintan and Karimun as a direct result of the growth triangle 
initiative now define the province’s economic landscape.6 Once the IMS-GT was 
established, however, Batam began to attract the highest levels of foreign 
investment, and as a consequence the largest volume of migrants from within 
Indonesia seeking work in the industrial parks and tourist resorts (Grundy-Warr et 
al. 1999; Bunnell et al. 2006). By 1998 Batam’s population had more than doubled 
while Bintan’s grew at a much slower rate (see Figure 1). When the national census 
was taken in 2000, 43 per cent of the population of the Riau Islands had been born 
in another province or overseas. Almost half of these migrants had moved to the 
islands since 1995 (Ananta and Bakhtiar 2005: 17). 
The IMS-GT was marred by numerous setbacks, culminating in the economic and 
political uncertainty following the Asian financial crisis (1997–98), when many 
multi-national investors began to downscale their levels of investment in Batam, 
and tourists, worried about social unrest, stayed away from the Bintan Resort 
zone.7 The crisis had the opposite effect, however, on internal migration. The Riau 
Islands’ relative prosperity became a magnet for people in other parts of the 
Indonesian archipelago. In the three years following the crisis (1998–2001), Bintan 
experienced a 34 per cent increase while the growth rate in Batam’s population 
reached an incredible 79.5 per cent. By the end of 2004, the population of the 
province as a whole was 1,285,617 – 277,986 of whom lived on Bintan Island 
(160,918 in Tanjung Pinang) and 633,944 on Batam (Bappeda Provinsi Kepri 
n.d.).8 Migrants from other parts of Indonesia were attracted to the Riau Islands by 
the prospects of employment in an economy that had been cushioned from the 
economic crisis of 1997–98, or because of their relative calm during the violence 
that erupted across the archipelago from 1998.9  
Although the impact of the crisis on economic investment was relatively short-
lived, the manufacturing sector has not recovered to pre-1997 levels and the growth 
triangle is generally regarded on all sides as a failure (Sparke et al. 2004). In recent 
years, however, growing global demand for oil has resulted in a boom in the 
shipping industries in the islands. In 2006, in an effort to re-invigorate the 
                                                     
6 For details of major IMS-GT projects, see Peachey et al. (1998) and Pereira (2004). 
7 Personal communication, senior figure within Bintan Resort Development Corporation, April 2006. 
8 The growth of Bintan’s population outside the capital reflects the employment opportunities in the 
Bintan Resort Zone, which employs a significant number of internal migrants. 
9 Kelly suggests that the official population figures for Batam are a vast underestimate given the 
numbers of unrecorded migrants arriving daily in the late 1990s. He cites a senior Batam Industrial 
Development Agency (BIDA) official estimate that the total may be as high as 500,000 in 1998, 
with 1,000–2,000 new arrivals drawn by prospects of employment and fleeing conflict 
disembarking every week (Kelly 2004: 77). 
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economies of the islands, Singapore and Indonesia announced the creation of 
Special Economic Zones in Batam, Bintan and Karimun (BBK SEZ). The SEZ 
Framework Agreement on Economic Cooperation outlines seven key areas that 
Indonesia and Singapore will cooperate in to ensure that business, regulatory and 
labour conditions in the islands are favourable to investors (Ministry of Trade and 
Industry 2006). The agreement is still in its infancy and it remains to be seen what 
impact the BBK SEZ will have on local communities and continuing migration 
flows. 
The rapid population growth in both Batam and Bintan has had a significant impact 
on the character of the urban communities on both islands. Lindquist (2002: 41) 
describes Batam as a “kind of crossroads inhabited by migrants and tourists 
[where] most people call somewhere else ‘home’, even if they have never been 
there, and most have plans to go elsewhere”. As the result of its long-standing 
status as an urban centre and the slower pace of economic development, Tanjung 
Pinang, the main town on Bintan, has far less of what Lindquist (2002: 12) calls 
Batam’s “distinct frontier-town atmosphere”. Earlier waves of migrants to Tanjung 
Pinang tended to assimilate into the local Malay culture and adopted an identity as 
Orang Riau (people from Riau) (Ford 2003b). However, importantly there has 
been some convergence between the social structures on Batam and Bintan over 
the last two decades. On Bintan, large numbers of new migrants, many of whom 
are less assimilationist than their counterparts in the 1960s and 1970s, have moved 
to Tanjung Pinang. On Batam, longer-term communities have developed that do 
call the island home. 
Perhaps the most significant changes since the early 1980s have been on the ethnic 
make-up of the island communities. These new waves of migration to the Riau 
Islands since the lead-up to the formation of the IMS-GT built on historical 
patterns, which had already created a markedly heterogeneous population in the 
region. The original populations of the islands consisted of Orang Melayu (Malays) 
and Orang Laut (nomadic fisher-people) (Wee 1985). During the colonial period 
considerable numbers of Bugis traders and warriors, as well as Chinese traders and 
coolies, began to arrive, creating an increasingly diverse and vibrant community 
(Roeroe et al. 2003). The enormous inflow of labour migrants from throughout 
Indonesia during the 1990s led to the development of an even more ethnically 
diverse population. Figures from the 2000 census show that on Batam, the Javanese 
constitute the single largest ethnic group, followed by Malays, Minang and Bataks. 
On Bintan, Malays make up the largest ethnic group, followed by Javanese and 
Minang (see Table 1). According to the census, of the almost 1,800 foreign citizens 
living in the islands, 180 were Singaporeans and 168 were Malaysians, 172 and 
133 of whom respectively were living in Batam. 
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Table 1: Population of Batam and Bintan by Ethnicity (2000) 
 Batam Bintan 
Ethnicity Number Percentage Number Percentage 
Malay 91 386 20.90 132 708 41.54 
Javanese 116 726 26.69 70 676 22.12 
Minang 65 057 14.87 20 023 6.27 
Batak 65 239 14.92 11 192 3.50 
Sundanese 14 162 3.24 8 220 2.57 
Bugis 9 999 2.29 6 785 2.12 
Flores 9 298 2.13 3 353 1.05 
Banjar 2 908 0.66 2 676 0.84 
Others 61 059 13.96 63 597 19.91 
Foreign 1 524 0.35 252 0.08 
Total 437 358 100.00 319 482 100.00 
Source: BPS Riau Province (2005a, 2005b). 
Although Chinese Indonesians are not specifically identified in provincial statistics 
tables, ethnic Chinese comprise a significant proportion of “others” on both 
islands, particularly Bintan, where the city of Tanjung Pinang has a large Chinese 
community. In 1930, 60 per cent of Tanjung Pinang’s population was Chinese 
(Butar-Butar 2000: 5). However, the influx of migrants, most of them not Chinese, 
over the last three decades has shifted the ethnic balance between the Chinese and 
non-Chinese in the city, and to a lesser extent in other parts of the Riau Islands.10 In 
1991 the Chinese community accounted for 16 per cent of the entire population of 
the Riau Islands (Rusli et al. 1996: 60), while national census data from 2000 show 
that the Chinese community in the Riau Islands comprised just under 10 per cent of 
the population (Ananta and Bakhtiar 2005: 20).  
The gender composition of the population has also changed considerably since the 
formation of the IMS-GT. On Batam since the late 1990s when the factory and port 
infrastructure was completed, construction workers and male factory workers 
began to be replaced by large numbers of female factory workers who were 
believed to be best suited to work in the electronic industries.11 Since 1999, women 
have outnumbered men on Batam, reflecting increased pressure on women in other 
parts of Indonesia to migrate for work as a result of the Asian Financial Crisis of 
1997-98 (BPS Kota Batam 2004). In contrast, in Bintan, men continue to 
outnumber women reflecting the island’s more traditional economic opportunity 
structures, which attract more male migrants than females (annual volumes of 
Kepulauan Riau Dalam Angka 1990–2005). This reflects the fact that the IMS-GT 
                                                     
10 Note that we have heard many accounts of Chinese from Jakarta and other major cities in Indonesia 
taking shelter in the islands during the anti-Chinese riots of 1998. 
11 For a discussion of the gendered ideologies associated with employment practices in export 
processing zones in Southeast Asia see Ong (1987) and Wolf (1992). 
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had a much less significant, and more differentiated, impact on development 
opportunities in Bintan where there is a much smaller manufacturing sector. The 
large resort enclave in the north of the island (which takes up almost one-third of 
the Bintan landmass), provides a limited number of jobs and is effectively cut off 
from the rest of the island, thereby reducing opportunities for associated service 
industries to develop alongside the resorts.   
The impact of these migratory flows on the life of island communities has been 
dramatic. While earlier waves of migrants tended to assimilate into local Malay 
culture, the sheer volume of later arrivals, combined with the often temporary 
nature of their sojourn, has meant that many groups continue to retain their 
languages and cultural practices. In some areas these ethnic differences are a 
source of tension, sometimes leading to open conflict. As new migrants settle and 
as the population of locally born residents grows, however, a new group of Orang 
Kepri have begun to emerge. 
1.2. The Riau Islands as a space of transit 
Most studies of Batam or the growth triangle make some reference to the large 
number of people passing through the islands in search of work overseas, but very 
little has been written on these international flows and their impact on the social 
and ethnic mix of different communities in the islands themselves. This silence 
belies the fact that the Riau Islands are a key point of departure and return for large 
numbers of tourists and international labour migrants from Indonesia to Singapore 
and Malaysia, and the extent of the impact of international flows – particularly 
those of labour migrants – have on local communities in the islands.  
Singapore receives significantly more visitors from Indonesia than from any other 
country. In 2003, 22 per cent of all visitors to Singapore held Indonesian passports. 
In that year, of a total of 1,341,708 Indonesian visitors to Singapore, 661,962 
arrived by sea, mostly from the Riau Islands (Singapore Tourism Bureau 2004: 
16).12 In the same year, 621,651 Indonesians visited Malaysia on tourist visas, or 
just under 6 per cent of a total of 10,576,915 visitors (Tourism Malaysia n.d.).13 
Although departure data do not disaggregate Indonesian tourists by place of 
residence, it is common knowledge that many Indonesians leaving through Batam 
in particular come from elsewhere in the archipelago, as it is far cheaper to take an 
internal flight to Batam and make the ferry crossing to Singapore, or less 
commonly to Malaysia, than to fly directly from Jakarta or other major Indonesian 
cities. In addition, all Indonesians pay less exit tax (or fiskal) if they leave by land 
or sea. Regular travellers may even seek to illegally obtain a local identity card and 
passport in the islands so that they can avoid the exit tax altogether. Batam’s status 
as a transit point for Indonesian tourists leaving for Singapore has had a significant 
impact on its economy. Staff at large hotels in Batam cite guests’ desire to travel 
                                                     
12 This figure also includes some Indonesian foreign domestic workers, since many domestic workers 
enter Singapore on a social visit pass before receiving an official work permit.  
13 We do not have access to statistics regarding how many of these Indonesians arrived by sea. 
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onto Singapore as a major consideration for both individual tourists and for event 
organisers, for whom Batam is now an established location for large conferences. 
As Bintan’s airport has been unavailable for large commercial flights for some 
years, it has not benefited from the same kind of tourist traffic.14 
The other major kind of cross-border traffic to flow through the Riau Islands 
consists of labour migrants seeking work in Singapore or Malaysia. In 2006, 1,910 
migrant workers left Tanjung Pinang through official channels to work overseas, 
61 per cent of them women (Dinas Tenaga Kerja dan Kesejahteraan Sosial 
Pemerintah Kota Tanjung Pinang 2006). Data collected from interviews with 
unofficial “passport agents” and labour sending companies in 2005 suggest that 
many more of the migrant workers who pass through the province are 
undocumented, or in possession of aspal (asli tapi palsu, real but fake) documents 
– official travel documents obtained illegally in the islands. As with tourists, Bintan 
and Batam’s roles in the flow of overseas labour migrants differs significantly. 
Batam is now the main official point of departure, particularly for migrants seeking 
to work in Singapore. This has particularly been the case since 2004, when the 
Indonesian Government introduced a requirement that all Indonesian women going 
abroad to work as domestic workers should be tested in Batam on their knowledge 
of English and household tasks before being deployed overseas (Zainol 2004). 
Significant numbers of workers seeking to enter Singapore and Malaysia illegally 
also pass through the Riau Islands. In 1986 Tanjung Pinang was considered the 
most strategic staging post to travel illegally to Singapore and Malaysia (Sobary 
and Foulcher 1987: 5). As transport infrastructure improved on the island of Batam 
it became the preferred departure point. However, many migrants travelling 
through irregular channels continue to leave from Bintan or the island of Karimun 
(Ford 2003a). The Riau Islands became a key staging point for illegal entry into 
Singapore and Malaysia in the aftermath of the Asian Financial Crisis. This was 
partly a consequence of the islands’ resilience to the economic problems facing 
other parts of Indonesia. Men and women travelled to the islands in large numbers 
hoping of finding work in the export manufacturing zones. Inevitably, the formal 
sector was unable to absorb them. With little prospect of work in their home 
villages many of these internal migrants made the decision to try their luck in 
Singapore and Malaysia. As the effects of the crisis finally began to be felt in the 
islands, internal migrant workers who had been laid off from their jobs in Batam’s 
formal sector also began to attempt to cross the border illegally.  
Workers who leave through official and unofficial channels spend a significant 
period of time in the islands before departure, housed in barracks or in agents’ 
homes, and undertaking “training” in local households (cf. Ford 2001). This 
phenomenon is so widespread that instead of using the word pembantu (helper or 
servant), local residents use the term TKI (Tenaga Kerja Indonesia, Indonesian 
                                                     
14 The airport between Sekupang and Tanjung Pinang, which was heavily used in the 1970s by 
mining interests, is currently being upgraded to accommodate flights from Jakarta and other major 
centres. 
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worker) – the Indonesian Government’s official term for blue-collar international 
labour migrants – to describe their household help. Although some intending 
migrant workers are given little opportunity to leave their barracks, many others 
engage in the life of the community during their time in the islands, patronising 
local businesses and recreation sites. Most local residents we interviewed in 2005-
2006 did not feel that they created a disturbance, although many did note that 
social problems did arise if agents kept them in holding centres too long before 
placing them overseas.  
The islands have not only become a major departure point for Indonesians seeking 
to work abroad, they have also become an arrival point for returning international 
migrants. Not all of these workers arrive in the islands of their own accord – while 
some are “dumped” in the islands by errant employers, others are “repatriated” to 
Indonesia by the Singaporean or Malaysian governments as part of their 
deportation actions. Some of these “illegals” seek to cross the border again as 
quickly as possible, while others return to their home provinces. Yet another group 
decide to remain in the islands, forming a new cohort of internal migrants. It is 
important, then, to remember that even temporary labour migrants become long-
term residents, creating increasingly heterogeneous populations and potentially 
transforming the meanings attached to “home”. 
Spaan (1994: 97) claims that illegal workers who returned to Batam in the early 
1990s were absorbed into the local manufacturing industry. As their numbers 
began to increase, however, local job opportunities became scarce. This problem 
became more apparent when increasing numbers of undocumented migrant 
workers were repatriated to the islands after the Malaysian Government passed a 
new immigration act in 2002 (see below). Many of the repatriated workers had 
neither the money nor the desire to return to their provinces of origin, instead 
hoping to earn enough money in the Riau Islands to permit them to leave for 
Singapore or Malaysia once more. However, their increasing presence put 
significant pressure on the transit zone’s economy and social infrastructure, and 
many migrants who stayed in the islands were absorbed into the informal sector 
and the vice industries, including prostitution, drug trade, smuggling and 
gangsterism (premanisme). More recently, there have been reports of female 
domestic workers being “dumped” in the islands by their Singaporean employers 
who do not want to pay the full cost of repatriating them to their home villages in 
Java and Sumatra. These women arrive in the islands often without money or 
contacts and have little means to return home (HRW 2005: 50). 
This analysis of the migration flows into and out of the Riau Islands demonstrates 
the fluid nature of the categories “internal” and “international” migrant.  The IMS-
GT may be criticised for failing to produce the levels of anticipated economic 
growth and development originally forecast by member nations, but it has had a 
dramatic impact on flows of people into the Riau Islands as well as flows across 
the border into Singapore and Malaysia. As our discussion indicates, these 
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migration flows were the consequence of a complex range of interconnected forces 
operating in the islands and abroad.  
2. Internal and International Borders 
In the previous section we documented the volume and type of migration into and 
out of the Riau Islands by internal and international migrants. These flows do not 
occur in a policy vacuum. A range of regulatory measures have been instituted to 
manage the flows of migrants into the province, between different islands in the 
province, and across the borders into Singapore and Malaysia. In this section, we 
describe the policy and legislative frameworks that attempt to control population 
movements into and out of the islands, and examine what impact they have had on 
those flows. 
2.1. International bordering practices 
Until relatively recently the concept of international migratory flows between 
Insular Riau and Singapore and Malaysia was rendered problematic by the lack of 
a locally recognised geopolitical boundary and the absence of clear national 
immigration regimes. The borders that today mark out the nation-states of insular 
Southeast Asia are based in large part on boundaries created under the Anglo 
Dutch Treaty of London (1824). Prior to this date, the Johor Sultanate, centred in 
the islands of Riau, was the site of political power in the region. Pre-colonial trade 
routes acted as conduits for the movement of people and goods and facilitated the 
creation of strong social, cultural and economic ties amongst different 
communities. The Anglo Dutch Treaty, however, effectively split the Johor-Riau 
Sultanate into two parts, each governed with varying degrees of success by their 
respective colonial powers (Trocki 1979; Tagliacozzo 2007). The British focused 
their attention on the Straits Settlements, and transformed Singapore into a 
dominant entrepôt, while the Dutch, distracted by events in Java and mainland 
Sumatra, exercised limited control over the Riau Islands. Meanwhile a flourishing 
Chinese barter trade between Singapore and Indonesia (labelled “smuggling” by 
the Dutch), saw the Riau islands become increasingly tied to the Singapore 
economy (Tagliacozzo 2007; Trocki 1990). 
The first attempts to regulate the flow of people throughout the Malay Archipelago 
occurred during the late colonial period. From the 1930s onwards, the British 
colonial authorities in the Straits Settlements were increasingly concerned about 
regulating the flow of Chinese and Indian labour migrants into Singapore and 
Malaya. By the end of the Second World War, Chinese migration into Malaya had 
effectively ceased (Kaur 2004: 212). In contrast, “Indonesians” were assumed to be 
of the same “racial stock” as local Malays (Kaur 2004: 209) and Indonesian labour 
migration to Malaya continued to be encouraged by the British. The Immigration 
Ordinance of 1953, however, saw the introduction of more stringent border 
controls into Malaya reflecting growing nationalist sentiment at the time. In the 
post-Second World War period in Singapore, attempts to regulate Indonesian 
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migration were complicated by the presence of a number of competing forces 
vying for international recognition of their status as official agents of the newly 
created Republic of Indonesia. For example, between 1945 and 1947 there were at 
least three different groups within Singapore issuing passports for the Republic 
(Yong 2003: 79)15 – not all of which were accepted within the Republican 
territories themselves, or by the Dutch.16 In reality, the papers held by cross-Strait 
travellers were of limited significance, and traders and their families continued to 
cross the border between Insular Riau and Singapore with relative ease. 
The Malayan Emergency (1948–60) saw the introduction of a compulsory system 
of identification cards for all Straits Settlement residents aged 12 years and over.17 
For some individuals, the issuing of formal identity papers actually allowed them 
to claim citizenship in their place of residence even though they had been born 
elsewhere. High levels of mobility meant that it was not uncommon for many 
families (both Malay and Chinese) to consist of children who were born in 
different places. Individuals, and sometimes entire families, simply adopted the 
nationality (and associated identity papers) that best suited them at the time. This 
changed significantly in 1963 when the formation of the Federation of Malaya led 
to a period of tense stand-off between Malaya and Indonesia, commonly referred to 
as Confrontation.18 With Confrontation, the border’s role in identifying and keeping 
apart the new national citizens of Indonesia and Malaya (soon to become Malaysia 
and Singapore in 1965) was made far more apparent.19 As citizenship laws began to 
be tightened, and immigration controls made it more difficult to cross the border 
without passports or other identity papers, some families found themselves divided. 
For individuals caught on the “wrong” side of the border during Confrontation, 
there was a strong imperative to “adopt” a new nationality as a means of proving 
one’s allegiance to the nation. The case of one of our informants, a “Singaporean 
Malay”, reveals the ease with which this transformation could take place. He and 
his brother were both born in Tanjung Pinang but went to school in Singapore. 
Their younger siblings were all born in Singapore, but moved back to Riau in the 
early 1960s. The family was separated during Confrontation and to avoid problems 
with local authorities, the boys simply “switched” citizenship by claiming they had 
lost their birth certificates. Instead, they relied on their school records to 
demonstrate that they were Singapore nationals.  
                                                     
15 By this time, there was a widespread understanding in Singapore that Dutch passports would not be 
accepted (Yong 2003: 79). 
16 For example, the Dutch declared that in Tanjung Pinang, only passports issued by Indoff (Indonesia 
Office), the Republic of Indonesia’s diplomatic mission in Singapore, would be recognised (Yong 
2003, 79). 
17 These identity cards became the basis for future immigration and citizenship regimes in the 
independent nations of Singapore and Malaysia. 
18 The Riau Islands, along with Indonesia’s land border with Sabah and Sarawak in Borneo, were a 
key location during the stand-off. Large numbers of defence force personnel from other parts of 
Indonesia were stationed in the islands at this time, a significant number of whom later settled 
there. 
19 For personal accounts of the difficulties faced by Bintan islanders in travelling to Singapore during 
this time, see Ford and Lyons (2006). 
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By the mid-1970s, cross-border movements were increasingly regulated by more 
stringent customs and passport checks on the Singaporean and Malaysian sides of 
the border. For those not officially seeking to cross borders for work, entry 
requirements for Indonesian, Singaporean and Malaysian passport holders to 
ASEAN member countries are now consistent. They may enter an ASEAN country 
without a visa and stay for up to thirty days on a tourist or social visit pass. Under 
the terms of the IMS-GT, Riau Islanders were offered improved access to 
Singapore and Malaysia because they would not have to pay the exit tax (fiskal) 
imposed by the Indonesian Government on its citizens.20 But while Singaporean 
and Malaysian immigration law supposedly treats all Indonesian passport holders 
in the same way, Riau Islanders’ ability to cross into Singapore or Malaysia is also 
influenced by immigration profiling that is mediated by ethnicity and class, which 
targets Indonesians deemed to be travelling for illegitimate purposes. Chinese 
informants have suggested that they find it easier to cross the border than their non-
Chinese compatriots. While many middle-class Riau Islanders continue to travel 
regularly to Singapore and Malaysia to visit relatives or for medical tourism, 
working and lower-middle class Indonesians face longer waiting times than civil 
servants or members of the upper-middle class. As they pass through immigration 
checkpoints their documents are carefully scrutinised, and they are often 
interrogated at length about the reasons for their journey. In Singapore, such 
visitors are frequently asked to provide proof of their ability to support their time in 
the city-state through the provision of uang tunjuk (show money).21 
The attention shown to Indonesian visitors by immigration officials in Singapore 
and Malaysia reflects ongoing – and increasingly punitive – attempts to regulate 
the flow of documented and undocumented labour migrants into both countries.22 
Up until the 1980s, Singapore and Malaysia received only a very small percentage 
of Indonesian labour migrants. Since the mid-1980s, however, increasing numbers 
of documented migrants are seeking work in the region (Nayyar 1997). Figures 
released in the 2000 census show that Singapore’s 612,200 foreign workers 
constitute 29.2 per cent of the total workforce. About 500,000 of these workers are 
considered unskilled or low-skilled, of which an estimated 150,000 are domestic 
workers, approximately one-third of whom are from Indonesia (Almenoar and Tan 
2004). In contrast, among the male foreign workers, Indonesian men constitute a 
small minority. The guest worker programme in Singapore is tightly regulated to 
ensure that low-skilled foreign workers remain temporary workers who can be 
easily repatriated during periods of economic recession. Among the measures used 
to control the flow of labour migrants are a work permit system, a dependency 
ceiling (which regulates the proportion of foreign to local workers), and a foreign 
                                                     
20 As noted above, many Indonesians from Jakarta and elsewhere fly to Batam and then make the 
ferry trip to Singapore or Malaysia in order to avoid the higher rate of fiskal charged on citizens 
leaving Indonesia by air, along with the higher costs of international flights. 
21 The need to provide uang tunjuk has given rise to a lucrative credit lending business on the 
Indonesian side of the border. 
22 Labour flows are also monitored, with varying degrees of success, on the Indonesian side of the 
border. Labour migrants are required to register with the Indonesian Department of Manpower, a 
task that is normally completed on their behalf by recruitment agencies. 
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worker levy (Huang and Yeoh 2003: 80). The majority of low skilled workers 
come through legal work placement agencies on a maximum of two years 
employment contract (subject to a one-off renewal).  
Significant numbers of Indonesians also enter Singapore to work illegally. Spaan 
(1994: 97) notes that in the early 1990s, as a consequence of the growing 
manufacturing sector in Batam, Javanese men were attracted to the islands and 
would alternate between work in Batam factories and illegal work in Singapore. 
There was an unprecedented growth in the numbers of illegal immigrants entering 
Singapore via the Riau Islands in 1998 as a consequence of the Asian Financial 
Crisis. While 1997 figures show a total of 84 illegal entrants arrested at sea that 
year (Straits Times 1998), the figure in April 1998 alone was 258 (Teo 1998). The 
authorities identified Batam and Tanjung Pinang as major hubs for smuggling 
syndicates who operated throughout Indonesia. In an effort to crack down on 
illegal migration, the Singaporean Government stepped up its coastal surveillance, 
as well as tightening immigration controls at the major checkpoints in the ferry 
terminals that serviced arrivals from the Riau Islands. Indonesians suspected of 
entering on tourist visas in order to work illegally were turned away at the 
immigration counters. The drop in the exchange rate made it more difficult for 
Indonesians to obtain the “right” amount of uang tunjuk. To spread news of its 
harsh treatment of illegal entrants, the Immigration Department started showing 
videos to passengers departing for Batam and Bintan at the World Trade Centre 
and Tanah Merah Ferry Terminals warning about tough immigration laws for 
illegal workers. The video showed illegal migrants being arrested at worksites and 
housing flats. Indonesians passing through the terminals were encouraged to tell 
their compatriots “back home” about the government crackdowns on “illegals”. 
Singaporeans were warned about the dangers of large numbers of unskilled 
Indonesian migrants entering Singapore and were urged to be vigilant in order to 
protect the island city (Miller and Singh 1998). They were told that as a nation, 
Singaporeans had to “grow calluses on their heart” when confronted with the plight 
of Indonesia’s poor.  
Due to increased global concerns about terrorism since 2001, Singapore began to 
step up border patrols in the Straits, and as a consequence the numbers of 
immigration offenders arriving by sea remains low. Immigration regulations, 
combined with an effective border control system and an active policy of 
monitoring the legal status of foreign workers in workplaces, have resulted in 
relatively low numbers of undocumented labour migrants.23 Our research suggests, 
however, that many Riau Islanders continue to enter the country on tourist passes 
and work as temporary labourers. Indonesians are recruited as cleaners and 
domestic helpers during key cultural and religious festivals such as Chinese New 
Year and Idul Fitri, and as seamstresses and handymen. These periods also attract 
significant numbers of hawkers and traders who sell goods in markets around the 
                                                     
23 153 people were arrested trying to enter Singapore by sea in 1999 (Ministry of Home Affairs 1999). 
This figure rose to 307 in 2000, but dropped to 123 in 2001 after a range of new border protection 
measures were introduced (Ministry of Home Affairs 2001). 
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islands. Indonesian women from the islands also enter Singapore on tourist passes 
to work temporarily in the local sex industry (Henson 2004). 
Indonesia’s contemporary sea border with Peninsular Malaysia is far more porous 
than its border with Singapore. In the 1970s, Indonesians were welcomed by the 
Malaysian Government as part of its attempt to “balance” Malaysian society 
demographically and economically after the race riots of 1969. However, following 
the economic recession of the mid-1980s public opinion turned against Indonesians 
(Crinis 2005). Migrant labour is an integral part of Malaysia’s economic growth 
and rising demand for skilled workers at home has seen the construction, 
plantation, forestry and services sectors experience labour shortages that have been 
filled by migrant labour. As of the end of June 2006, 1.84 million registered 
foreign workers were employed in Malaysia. These constituted over 16 per cent of 
the workforce. Of these, 64.7 per cent were from Indonesia (Ministry of Finance 
Malaysia 2007: 78). Indonesian women typically occupy positions in 
manufacturing, hospitality and domestic work. Recent figures suggest that there are 
more than 161,000 documented domestic workers, over half of whom come from 
Indonesia (Chin 2003). In addition, there are estimated to be almost as many 
undocumented migrant women working as domestic workers in Malaysian homes 
(Tenaganita 2005). Indonesian men work in the construction, manufacturing and 
plantation sectors.  
The Malaysian Government has long sought to regulate the flow of Indonesian 
migrant workers while allowing large numbers to enter illegally between 
crackdowns. Although Indonesian workers are an integral part of the Malaysian 
economy they are subject to regular deportation campaigns. These deportations are 
short-lived and large numbers of foreign workers subsequently return (Ford 2006). 
Undocumented workers are deemed to be “illegal” and are subjected to harsh and 
arbitrary immigration laws. Because of their status, undocumented migrants are 
frequently subject to harassment, extortion and theft by the police and immigration 
authorities. Those arrested can be detained in detention camps under extremely 
harsh conditions for such periods as are deemed necessary to arrange for their 
deportation (Suaram 2003). Like the Singaporean Government, the Malaysian 
Government also intensified its efforts to control labour migration from Indonesia 
after the Asian Financial Crisis. These efforts culminated in the revision of the 
Immigration Act in 2002 and the subsequent deportation of hundreds of thousands 
of undocumented workers to Belawan, Batam and Dumai in Sumatra, and 
Pontianak and Nunukan in Kalimantan (Ford 2006). However, Malaysia’s labour 
immigration regime continues to operate on regular but unpredictable cycles of 
crackdowns and unofficial policy relaxation, depending on the needs of the labour 
market and the political pressure of community hostility to labour migrants. In 
recent years, during crackdowns, the threat of arrest has increased with the 
commissioning of volunteer forces (known as RELA). As extensive press coverage 
has confirmed, the RELA forces have a reputation for violent behaviour and racial 
profiling. According to NGO sources, RELA members receive a bounty for each 
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irregular labour migrant they arrest, in addition to a daily allowance for their 
expenses.  
Tightening immigration regimes are not the only factors that account for changes in 
the numbers and levels of cross-border migration into Singapore and Malaysia. 
Significant differences in the wages and costs of living in the three countries make 
it expensive for Indonesians to travel abroad. Although wealthier Riau Islanders 
continue to holiday in Singapore and Malaysia – along with wealthy Indonesians 
from other parts of the archipelago – our lower middle and working-class 
respondents have indicated that after the crisis the border began to represent a 
serious barrier to their mobility. This time, however, it was not because physical 
movement was restricted, but because growing economic disparities began to 
disrupt their dreams and expectations about a shared “way of life” across the Straits 
(Ford and Lyons 2006). 
2.2. Construction of internal borders 
The inflow of inter-provincial migrants has also been a matter of concern for 
different levels of government. In 1928, the Dutch Government made the Riau 
Archipelago into a free trade zone in an attempt to take over some of the trade then 
passing through Singapore (Touwen 2001: 90). Our older long-term respondents in 
Karimun and Tanjung Pinang indicated that people arriving from other parts of 
Indonesia were required to have special documentation. Many of the labour 
migrants who came to Batam from the late 1970s were recruited under a 
programme involving eleven other Indonesian provinces. Called the Angkatan 
Kerja Antar Daerah (Inter-Region Work Force) (Roeroe et al. 2003), the 
programme allowed migrants to stay in Batam if they found stable formal-sector 
jobs. Similar arrangements were put in place under the IMS-GT. The Batamindo 
Authority created a special subsidiary company (TunasCarrier) to recruit labour on 
behalf of companies located on the site. Employees were sought from all over 
Indonesia and were signed up on contracts with the subsidiary company rather than 
the individual employers (Murray and Perera 1996: 62). These restrictive contracts 
ensured that the migrant workers were bound to TunasCarrier and could not change 
jobs freely. Companies in Batam were responsible for providing housing for their 
employees and for covering the costs of their repatriation to their home villages at 
the end of their employment contracts. This arrangement was largely unsuccessful 
in regulating the inflow of migrants to Batam, as large numbers of people arrived 
using the services of unofficial labour recruiters (calo) or came of their own 
accord. A number of multinationals, unhappy with the quality of labour supplied by 
Batamindo, also began to source their labour themselves (Murray and Perera 1996: 
62). 
These attempts to regulate the inflow of migrant workers needed for the 
manufacturing and tourism sectors have had a negative impact on the employment 
opportunities of resident Riau Islanders. Bintan islanders who travel to Batam in 
search of work in the factory zones have found themselves disadvantaged by a 
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system of recruitment that operates on networks based in Java and the Sumatran 
mainland, resulting in lesser access to jobs for local islanders as well as poorer 
wages and conditions. “Local hires” are offered lower wages that workers recruited 
from other parts of Indonesia, and are often the first to be retrenched when there is 
a downturn in production. On Bintan, the Lobam EPZ and the Bintan Resort Zone 
are located long distances from the main urban communities and jobs were largely 
taken up by Indonesian migrant workers from Sumatra, Sulawesi, Java and Bali. 
These internal bordering practices served to create tensions between long-term 
residents and local arrivals. These tensions were further heightened as migrants 
increasingly moved into areas where locals were traditionally employed. 
The local economies of Batam and Bintan could not successfully absorb all the 
migrants that arrived in the decade following the Asian Financial Crisis. As the 
population increased, so too did levels of unemployment. National data indicate 
that in 2003, the proportion of working-age Riau Islanders not in work was as high 
as 17.68 per cent in the old Riau Islands Regency (incorporating Tanjung Pinang), 
while Batam reached 19.74 per cent. In that same year, approximately 44 per cent 
of the working-age population of the Riau Islands Regency was employed in the 
formal sector, while in Batam the figure was over 71 per cent (Ananta and Bakhtiar 
2005: 23). Batam’s infrastructure in particular was unable to keep up with the large 
numbers of migrants arriving every week. The situation was exacerbated by the 
fact that at this time the Riau Islands were also the staging post for the departure of 
large numbers of undocumented labour migrants seeking work in Singapore and 
Malaysia. In Batam, most of the local housing had been built for factory workers 
and was simply not available to the unemployed and those in the informal sector. 
The housing shortage resulted in the establishment of large squatter settlements 
across the island (Grundy-Warr et al. 1999). There have been sporadic attempts by 
local authorities to dismantle these squatter settlements, but many have grown into 
established communities with electricity, water and other services. 
The creation of the new province of Kepri in September 2002 as part of the 
Indonesia’s regional autonomy programme has given local authorities greater 
capacity to regulate the flows of labour migrants through the implementation of 
local government regulations, or peraturan daerah.24 Batam introduced population 
controls through Local Government Regulation No. 2/2001 on the Registration and 
Control of the Population in the City of Batam, which came into force on 1 October 
2001. Under the regulation, people undertaking family visits are only permitted to 
remain for a period of fifteen days, while business and other visitors have to 
present paperwork demonstrating the purpose of their visit. Newcomers seeking 
work have to deposit sufficient funds for a return ticket and demonstrate that they 
have enough money to cover fifteen days’ living costs in Batam. Those not 
planning to settle permanently in Batam are issued temporary local identity cards 
(Batam City Government 2001).  
                                                     
24 In the Riau Islands, these laws build on attempts to regulate in-migration in the period before 
Confrontation. Similar regulations were enacted in Jakarta and a number of other provinces after 
regional autonomy. 
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Attempts by local authorities in Batam to manage these flows in turn had flow-on 
effects in other places in the province. As it became increasingly difficult for 
prospective international migrants to cross the border from Batam, they attempted 
to do so by going through Bintan and Karimun. This put considerable pressure on 
local authorities to do something about the problem. Police were on standby in the 
ports and instructed to round up individuals whom they suspected were planning to 
cross the border illegally (Ford 2003a). Newspaper reports suggest that in 2001 as 
many as 183 people were deployed to ports in Batam itself and to twelve departure 
checkpoints in Jakarta, Mainland Sumatra, and in Tanjung Balai Karimun, Kundur, 
Tanjung Batu, Tanjung Pinang in the Riau Islands (Kompas 2001), and by 
December 2006 the Batam local government had collected Rp.160,000,000 in 
return ticket deposits under the law (Batam Pos Online 2007). The enforcement of 
these regulations has been patchy and sporadic. In most ports, officials do not 
bother to check travel papers or determine who is a migrant and who is a local. One 
of our informants stated that most officials ignore travellers on intra-island ferries 
and focus their attention on boats arriving from other provinces. 
Another structure developed in the province to regulate the presence of Indonesians 
from other parts of the Archipelago is the system of holding centres for 
undocumented labour migrants expelled from Malaysia. By late 2004, the 
provincial government had established four holding centres with a combined 
capacity of 2,000 people in Batam, and another centre, accommodating up to 600 
people, in Tanjung Pinang. The Batam holding centre was located in a facility built 
earlier to detain Indonesian citizens found to be in breach of Local Government 
Regulation No. 2/2001, which by 2004 was no longer in use since the inflow of 
migrants from other parts of Indonesia had stabilised (Head of the Batam local 
government’s population division cited in Tempointeraktif 2004). Deported 
migrant workers are not permitted to stay in the Riau Islands: after a maximum 
period of two weeks, they are returned to their home provinces.25 In 2006 alone, 
16,805 Indonesians passed through the Tanjung Pinang holding centre (Satuan 
Tugas Tim Pemulangan Tenaga Kerja Indonesia Bermasalah (TKI-B) dan 
Keluarganya dari Negeri Malaysia Kota Tanjung Pinang 2006a, 2006b, 2006c).  
Given the limited success that the provincial authorities have had in restricting the 
inflow of migrants seeking to use the Riau Islands as a staging post for cross-
border labour migration, these rules represent a very partial attempt to regulate 
migration flows after the fact. Local authorities recognise that there is little they 
can do to restrict attempts by migrant workers to cross the border into Malaysia for 
work, especially when demand for their labour continues to rise. The cycles of 
recruitment and deportation continue to put stress on local government services 
already stretched by the large resident migration population. 
                                                     
25 In Tanjung Pinang, the practice is for deportees to arrive on a Thursday, and to stay a maximum of 
three nights (interview with NGO worker, Tanjung Pinang, November 2006). 
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3. Teasing Out the Links 
We noted in our introduction that much of the literature on migration in Indonesia 
treats internal and international flows of people as separate phenomenon. Our 
discussion of the Riau Islands demonstrates, however, that within transit zones 
these categories frequently overlap and individuals may move from one category to 
the other within a short space of time. The geographical proximity of the Riau 
Islands to Singapore and Malaysia, combined with the IMS-GT initiative, serves as 
a magnet for large numbers of internal migrants from throughout Indonesia. While 
many of these people migrate under formal labour recruitment programmes, many 
others travel to the islands independently in search of better employment prospects. 
Significant numbers of these “internal” migrants become international migrants 
when they cross the border in the hope of finding jobs abroad. The difficulties 
associated with labelling migrant workers as either “internal” or “international” 
become even more apparent when we consider the cases of international migrants 
who spend long periods of time in the islands prior to departure, or who return to 
the islands between their overseas trips. The cyclical nature of demand for foreign 
workers in Malaysia in particular means that many of these “international” 
migrants may in fact settle in the islands rather than returning “home”. Further 
complicating the distinction between internal and international migration are those 
groups of migrant workers who move across the border on a daily and weekly basis 
to work illegally in Singapore and Malaysia. Many of these workers are internal 
migrants to the Riau Islanders, but make their living as undocumented international 
labour migrants. 
At the same time, however, we recognise that it is important both analytically (and 
in policy terms) to make a distinction between national and international flows of 
people. As our discussion of the regulatory frameworks employed by local and 
national governments has shown, different forms of migration require different 
policy responses. While both groups of migrants place an enormous strain on 
services and infrastructure, the needs of both groups are often quite different. 
Nonetheless, the fluid nature of migration flows in the transit zones means that 
Indonesian authorities cannot address the needs of these different groups of 
migrants in isolation from each other. As we have argued, international migration 
has an enormous impact on life in the Riau Islands. Responding to international 
migrants as individuals who are simply on their way “somewhere else”, whether 
that destination be “home” or abroad, ignores the realities of life in the border zone. 
Similarly, treating internal migrants as either a transitory workforce who will go 
“home” when the job market shrinks, or as a homogeneous group of settlers who 
will assimilate into islander life, overlooks the complex character of Kepri’s multi-
ethnic population. 
The fluid character of internal and international migration in the transit zone also 
has important implications for Indonesia’s regional neighbours. Our discussion 
demonstrates that internal migration cannot simply be understood as a matter of 
national concern to be dealt with by the Indonesian Government alone. As the 
problems associated with the Asian Financial Crisis illustrate, decisions made by 
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Singaporean (and to a limited extent Malaysian) investors to withdraw from the 
Riau Islands had flow on effects on the Singaporean and Malaysian economies. As 
factories shut down, the mostly single workforce suddenly found itself unemployed 
and a long way from home. The policy of recruiting staff from other parts of 
Indonesia, rather than training a locally based workforce, exacerbated 
unemployment levels. Unable to rely on their extended families, these workers 
looked for other ways to make a living. Many of them attempted to cross the 
border, while others found work in the largely illicit informal sector. Singapore and 
Malaysia stepped up border security efforts and immigration checks in order to 
cope with the influx of illegal workers and the impact of a growing underworld 
economy in the islands. 
International bordering practices by Indonesia’s neighbours can also impact on 
policymaking by local and provincial authorities. Malaysia’s policy of opening and 
then closing its borders has had an enormous impact on the Riau Islands. As we 
have discussed, provincial authorities have had to introduce a range of local laws to 
control population movements into the islands. While these laws are targeted at all 
arrivals, their primary focus is on individuals who are attempting to use the islands 
as a departure point for undocumented labour migration to Malaysia. In this case, 
the Riau Islands’ status as a transit point requires a local-level response to an issue 
that local authorities do not regard as a problem of their own making. The multiple 
problems associated with policing these laws, together with endemic corruption, 
have meant that these regulations have had little effect on population movements 
into and out of the islands. While unemployment levels remain high in the islands, 
the need to try and control these flows will remain. 
4. Conclusion 
The Riau Islands’ location on Indonesia’s borders with Singapore and Malaysia has 
significant implications for the province’s demographic profile and policies of 
population control. Like many borderland regions, the islands have experienced 
rapid social and economic transformation by virtue of their proximity to wealthier 
economies, particularly Singapore. The growth of manufacturing and service 
industries in Batam and Bintan as part of the IMS-GT created a demand for labour, 
and improved transport infrastructure facilitated the movement of people into the 
islands. Significant numbers of migrants were attracted by the prospect of 
employment in the export processing zones and resort zones on Batam and Bintan. 
As economic conditions became more difficult throughout Indonesia as a 
consequence of the Asian Financial Crisis, the prospect of finding employment in 
the islands continued to be a major drawcard for internal migrants. 
While the islands were initially able to absorb some of these new arrivals, growing 
unemployment led many of these migrants to consider crossing the border in search 
of work. They joined many thousands of other hopefuls who arrived in the islands 
intent on crossing the border illegally. As economic conditions worsened in the 
islands, earlier waves of labour migrants lost their jobs and joined them. These 
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groups of potential undocumented workers are not the only international labour 
migrants to arrive in the islands. In recent years the Indonesian Government has 
sought to use the islands as a staging post for documented migration flows, 
particularly through its “one gate programme for domestic workers. The cross-
border flows of people have grown even as the geopolitical borders that separate 
them have become more tangible and more tightly regulated. Although these 
movements have historical origins, they are also a product of the specific 
contemporary character of the Riau Islands border zone. Despite increased security 
concerns and policing of the border zone, the geographical proximity of the Riau 
Islands to Singapore and Malaysia means that they remain attractive as a place to 
cross the border as well as a destination in themselves.  
As we have argued here the impact of migration on the Riau Islands is a complex 
phenomenon that cannot be explained with reference to Indonesia’s geopolitical 
borders alone. An analysis of cross-border economic integration, migrant flows, 
and the formation of multi-ethnic communities requires an approach which gives 
attention to different geographical sites (in this case Batam and Bintan islands) and 
different forms of migration. Our research shows not only that geopolitical borders 
are not as strong a barrier as is generally suggested in the literature on the Riau 
Islands, but that these borders are not the only kinds of formal barriers to mobility 
in the border zone. It is essential, then, to examine the boundaries that define the 
multiple spaces which constitute the border zone. It is also important to recognise 
the special character of internal and international migration in transit zones, in 
which individuals can move from one category to the other very quickly, or belong 
to both categories at once. These complexities necessitate research and policy 
responses that take into account the unique character of the transit provinces, and 
the role that their geography plays in the formation of multi-ethnic communities 
and the management of migration. 
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